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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-No INDIGENT
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT MAY BE SENTENCED TO A TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT UNLESS HE HAS BEEN AFFORDED RIGHT TO
APPOINTED COUNSEL
Petitioner was convicted of theft' in an Illinois state court and
fined $50.00, without being represented by defense counsel at his
trial. 2 Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Illinois Supreme
Court, contending that, because a term of imprisonment was an
authorized penalty for the crime he had been charged with,3 the
sixth 4  and fourteenth 5  amendments to the United States
I. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368 (1979). Petitioner Aubrev Scott's conviction was bascd
upon a violation of chapter 38. section 16-1(A) (1) of Illinois Revised Statutes. The penalty provision
ofthe statute at the time in question provided:
A person first convicted of theft of property not from the person and not cx-
ceeding $150 in value shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in a pcnal in-
stitution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year or both. A person con-
victed of such theft a second or subsequent time, or after a prior conviction ofany type
of theft, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from one to five years....
itv.. RFv. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(A)(1) (1969).
2. 440 U.S. at 368. On January 19, 1972, petitioner was apprehended for shoplifting mer-
chandise at the F. W. Woolworth store in Chicago, Illinois. He posted bond and was released pen-
ding a first court appearance in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Illinois. on January 31. 1972.
The court advised him that he was charged with theft, and conc'luded that there wis, in fact,
probable cause for the charge. Petitioner subsequently indicated that he was ready for trial, the court
ordered him arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty. Having waived a jury trial, his bench trial
followed immediately, and resulted in conviction and a fine of $50. At no time during the entire
proceeding was he ever advised of any right to be represented by counsel. People v. Scott, 68 II. 2d
269, 270, 369 N.E.2d 881,882 (1977).
3, 68 111. 2d at 272, 369 N.E.2d at 882.
4. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "In ll
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. Section one of the fourteenth amendment to the United Mtates tonstitution provtdes tn
relevant part: "INlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.... " U,S. CONST. amend. XIV. 5 1
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Constitution required that he be afforded the right to court-
appointed defense counsel at his trial. The Supreme Court of
Illinois affirmed the conviction, and held that an indigent criminal
defendant is entitled to court-appointed defense counsel only if he is
actually incarcerated upon conviction, even though imprisonment
was an authorized penalty for the offense charged. 6 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, and held that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution do not
require that counsel be appointed for indigent criminal defendants
in cases in which incarceration is an authorized penalty but is not
actually imposed. 7 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
The common-law rule in England denied the aid of counsel to
a person accused of a felony. 8 Persons accused of misdemeanors,
however, were entitled to the full assistance of counsel. 9 It was not
until 1836, when an act of Parliament granted the full right to
counsel in felony cases, that this rule was abandoned.10 The rule
denying persons accused of a felony the assistance of counsel had
been highly criticized, and was rejected by all of the American
colonies before the adoption of the United States Constitution."i
The right to counsel was incorporated into the sixth amendment. 12
In early decisions, however, the courts had held that the sixth
amendment right to counsel granted only the right to employ
counsel in federal felony prosecutions. 3 It was not until 1972 that
the United States Supreme Court, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 14
expressly recognized the right to appointed counsel in all criminal
6. 68 Ill. 2d at 272, 369 N.E.2d at 882. The Supreme Court of Illinois noted in its opinion that
Scott had conceded that the United States Supreme Court had not yet extended the right to counsel
to prosecutions in which imprisonment is a potential penalty for the crime charged but the con-
viction results in only a fine. Id. The Illinois court based its holding upon Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972), and stated that in Ar,ersin4'er "the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to all
criminal prosecutions which resulted in actual imprisonment." 68 ill. 2d at 272. 369 N.E.2d at 882.
7. 440 U.S. at 373-74.




12. Id. at 61-66. At least twelve of the original thirteen colonies had adopted the right to employ
counsel in all criminal prosecutions. Id. at 64.
13. For a discussion of the right to counsel in English and early American law, see W. BEANY.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEt IN AMERICAN C6uRTs 27-30 (1955). See also 407 U.S. at 30. The Court in
Argersinter recognized that the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision had been treated as a
retraction of the common-law right to counsel in petty offenses, but expressed its skepticism of such a
principle:
The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its common law
dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, or in
the decisions of this Court. to indicate that it was intended to embody a retraction of
the right in petty offenses wherein the common law previously did require that counsel
be provided.
407 U.S. at 30.
14. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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prosecutions which resulted in imprisonment, whether petty,
misdemeanor, or felony.' 5
One landmark decision in the line of cases leading up to
Argersinger was Powell v. Alabama.16 Powell took a step toward ex-
panding the constitutional right to counsel to the state by holding
that in some circumstances an uncounseled criminal conviction in a
state court may be so unfair that it violates a defendant's due
process rights. 7 In Powell, the Court reversed the uncounseled
death sentence convictions of six black youths who had been
charged with raping two white girls.' Under the facts of the case,
the Court found that the failure of the state trial court to afford the
defendants reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was
a denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. 19
Furthermore, the Court held that, because the defendants were un-
able to secure counsel or make their own defense, the failure of the
trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was also a
denial of due process.
20
Another important predecessor to Argersinger was Gideon v.
Wainwright. 21 The United States Supreme Court in Gideon adopted
the reasoning in Powell,2 2 concluding that the sixth amendment's
right to counsel was one of the fundamental rights made obligatory
upon the states by the fourteenth amendment. 23 Gideon firmly
15. Id at 37. The Court in Aryersiner held that no indigent criminal defindant may hc inm-
prisoned for any offense unless he wits represented by counsel at his trial. Id.
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. 68-71 (1932).
18. Id. at 50, 73.
19. Id. at 71. After reviewing the history of the right to counsel and the facts of the case, the
Court stated:
In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion - the ignorance
and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the
imprisonment and the close stfrveillance of the defendants by militarv forces .... and
above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives - we think the failure of the trial
court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear
denial of due process.
Id.
20. Id. The Court stated that "under the circumstances just stated, the necessity ofcounsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel
was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning ofthe Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
23..Id. at 342. Gideon overruled the earlier case of Betts v. Brady. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 372 U.S.
at 345. The Court in Betts had formulated a case-by-case fundamental fairness analsis to determine
whether the right to counsel was necessary for a fair trial. 316 U.S. at 473. The Betis Court declined
to hold that the sixth amendment's right to counsel was one of the fundamental rights made
obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 471. It was on this point that the Court
in Gideon disagreed:
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a
provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court
435
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established that the states must provide appointed counsel in felony
trials to criminal defendants unable to employ counsel
themselves. 24 It was not clear from the Court's decision in Gideon,
however, whether the right to counsel attached to criminal
proceedings other than felony prosecutions.2 5 The United States
Supreme Court answered this question in Argersinger,2 6 holding that
no person may be imprisoned for an offense, whether petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at
trial. 2 The Court's rationale was that the legal and constitutional
questions involved in any case that actually results in imprisonment
may be complex.2 8 The Court therefore found that, regardless of
the crime charged or the potential sentence, the right to counsel
should apply if the defendant is imprisoned upon conviction.
2 9
In Argersinger, the Court was confronted with a conviction for
which a sentence of imprisonment was actually imposed. 30 It was
not clear from the opinion in Argersinger whether the right to counsel
would apply if imprisonment was an authorized pen'alty for the
crime charged but was not actually imposed. 3' The Court reached
this issue in Scott v. Illinois.32 Petitioner argued that the line of
United States Supreme Court cases which culminated in Argersingrer
required that the states provide counsel whenever imprisonment is
an authorized penalty for the crime charged, regardless of whether
imprisonment is actually imposed. 33  The Court rejected
in Bells was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.
372 U.S. at 342.
24. 372 U.S. at 342-45. Although it is not unmistakably clear from its language. Gideon was
found by the United States Supreme Court. in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). to have con-
ferred an absolute right to court-appointed counsel in state felony prosecutions. Id. at 134. Prior to
Gideon, the Court had recognized a sixth amendment right to court-appointed counsel in all federal
felony cases. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
25. See372 U.S. at 342-45.
26. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
27. Id. at 37. The Court in Areersin~eer reversed the conviction of an indigent who had been
charged with an offense punishable by six months imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both. Id. at 26.
The case was tried without a jury, and the accused, unrepresented by counsel, was sentenced to
ninety clays in jail. Id.
28. Id. at 
3 3
. The Court stated:
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-
offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period
are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or more.
Id.
29. Id. The Court further stated that "[tlhe trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. while only
brief sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often bristle with thorny constitutional
questions. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 [19721." Id.
30. 407 U.S. at 37.
31. Id.
32. 440 U.S. at 368.
33. Id.
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petitioner's argument, holding that the right to counsel attaches
only in cases in which a criminal defendant is actually sentenced to
a term of imprisonment, regardless of the authorized penalty.
34
Following the rule thus established, the Court in Scott affirmed
petitioner's uncounseled conviction because he had not been in-
carcerated. 
3 5
The Scott Court approached the question of when the right to
counsel should attach by attempting to determine the intent of the
framers of the sixth amendment. 36 Finding that intent to be un-
clear, the Court concluded that its prior decisions had gone far
beyond whatever the sixth amendment was originally intended to
require. 37 The Court recognized that it could not return to the com-
mon-law rule, which unreasonably denied the right to counsel in
felony cases, and appeared reluctant to retreat from its precedents
which had expanded the right to counsel to its status under Arger-
singer.38  The Court decided, however, not to extend these
precedents any further. 39 In spite of suggested alternatives, 40 the
34. Id. at 369, 373-74.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 370. The Scott Court expressed doubt that the sixth amendment of the United States
Constitution was originally contemplated to extend beyond the right to employ a lawyer in federal
criminal prosecutions. Id. To support this statement, the Court cited W. BFANY, THE. RItT TO
COUNSEI. IN AMRRCAN COiURTs 27-30 (1955). This treatise states that the sixth amendment was in-
tended by its framers only to give a defendant the right to employ counsel in a federal capital case,
not to guarantee the appointment of counsel by the government for an indigent in every criminal
case. Beany notes, however, that appointment of counsel was, nevertheless, a practice or custom
among lower federal courts whenever dictated by the requirements of a fair trial. W. BEANY, supra, at
30.
37. 440 U.S. at 372. Referring to the line of cases leading up to Ar'ersinker, the Court stated:
As a matter of constitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, less willing to ex-
trapolate an already extended line when, although the general nature of the principle
sought to be applied is clear, its precise limits and their ramifications become less so.
We have now in our decided cases departed from the literal meaning of the Sixth
Amendment. And we cannot fall back on the common law is it existed prior to the
enactment of that Amendment, since it perversely gave less in the way of right to
counsel to accused felons than to those accused'of misdemeanors.
Id.
38. 440 U.S. at 372-73. The Scott Court was apparently reluctant to retreat from Argersin er, as it
discussed its approval of the holding in Arywrsin,'er and noted that the standard set oit therein had
been workable. Id.
39. Id.
40. See 440 U.S. at 382-89 (Brennan, .J., dissenting). The alternative urged upon the Court in
Scott by Justice Brennan was the " 'authorized imprisonment' standard that would require the
appointment ofcounsel for indigents accused ofany offense for which imprisonment for any time was
authorized." Id. at 382. Brennan's dissent points out what he terms the "indefensible position" of
the Court in its conclusion that the Argersinger "actual imprisonment standard" is the only test for
determining right to counsel in state misdemeanor cases. Id, Brennan proceeded to establish the
superiority of an "authorized imprisonment standard" on several points: I) this standard would
more readily implement two principles of the sixth amendment - that the defendant has an
interest in avoiding the stigma ofa conviction to invoke due process protection under In Re Winship.
397 U.S. 358, 363, 364 (1970). and that the authorized penalty is the true measure of the seriousness
ofan offense under Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969): 2) the standard would not be
an administrative problem, because it avoids "the necessity of time-consuming consideration of the
likely sentence in each individual case before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate
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Court found that Argersinger drew the line for the right to appointed
counsel at the point at which a term of imprisonment is actually
imposed. 41 The Court also concluded that the central premise of
Argersinger was that actual incarceration is a punishment different in
kind and degree from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment,
42
stressing that Argersinger deemed any deprivation of liberty by
incarceration a severe sanction. 43  Also, the Court found that
Argersinger had proved workable in a practical sense.4 In that light,
the Court asserted that any extension of Argersinger would create
confusion and impose unpredictable burdens upon the states.
4 5
There are several questions left open by the Scott Court's
specific holding that no indigent defendant may be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial. The Court did not indicate under what cir-
cumstances an uncounseled conviction, valid under Scott, may be
used collaterally against the convicted defendant. 46 One such
predictions, unequal treatment, and apparent and actual bias"; 3) the "'authorized imprisonment'
test ensures that courts will not abrogate legislative judgments concerning the appropriate range of
penalties to be considered for each offense"; 4) problems with the "actual imprisonment standard"
necessarily lead to violations of the clue procss and equal protection clatuscs: 5) the staus' fiscal
olbjete(+ions to the "authorized imprisonment standard" are irrelevant and speculative. 441) 1.. S at
382-89 (Brennan..J., dissenting).
In a separate dissent, .Justice Blackmun suggests a t(ompromisi, adcwatling that thew right t
counsel extend at least as far as the right to jury trial under Baldwin v. New York, 3il) U.S. 66
(1970), which extended the right to jury trial to every case in which a penaltv of grc'alr than six
months is authorized, or in which the defendant is convictetd and ac(tually imprisone(I. 44) U..S. at
389-90 (Blackmun, .., dissenting).
41. 440 U.S. at 373-74.
42. Id. The Court stated:
Although the intentions of the Ar ersin'er Court are not unmistakablv clear f'rint
its opinion, we conclude today that Arersiner did indeed delimit the ('onstit tition;l
right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings. Even were the matter res oI,
we believe that the central premise of Arqersiner - that actual imprisonment is a
penalty different in kind from ines or the mere threat of imprisonment - is eminently
sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the linu( defining the
constitutional right to appointment of counsel.
Id. (footnote omitted).
43. Id, at 372-73.
44. Id. at 373.
45. Id. In support of his belief that adopting the "authorized imprisonment standard" would
not place an undue financial burden upon the states, Brennan's dissent cites ex(ensivelv to state
statutes and cases implementing some form of the stanlard. Id. at 385-86 n. I (Brennan. J..
dissenting). Some empirical work has been clone on the impact ofArlervinger which indicates that.
although some states have had difficulty implementing its rule, its requirements have not proved
unduly burdensome. See, e.g., Ingraham, The Impact ofAriersiner - One Year Later, 8 lAs & SOcr'y
RF.v. 615(1974); S. KRANTZ, RIHTTO CotNsEt. N CRtMtNAn. CASF.S(1976).
46. SeeGiffin v. Blackburn, 594 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1979). In Gif'fin. the court held that an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction which did not result in imprisonment was properly usedl to
impeach the defendant in a subsequent armed robbery prosecution. Id. The court in GCffin
characterized the holding in Scott as follows:
The Court's opinion is short, broad, and grounded in basic principles. It displays
no disposition to distinguish between possible effects, uses iir c'onsequences of such
convictions. The authorities it cites as being in conflict are quite disparate. factually.
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question presented by Scott's actual imprisonment test is whether a
person who was not represented by counsel may be given a suspen-
ded sentence or probation which does not include incarceration,
but which later may be revoked. 47 The holding in Scott stated that
no indigent defendant may be "sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment" unless he has been provided with the right to ap-
pointed counsel.4 8 A suspended sentence or term of probation is
arguably not a sentence to an actual term of imprisonment.4 9 It is
possible, however, that the suspended sentence or probation may
later be revoked and imprisonment imposed. It is unclear from the
opinion in Scott whether such imprisonment following an un-
counseled conviction would be violative of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments 50
The holding in Scott also left open the question of whether an
uncounseled conviction which does not result in incarceration may
be used under an enhancement statute providing for more severe
penalties for multiple offenders. 51 The original uncounseled con-
Logically, if a conviction is valid for purposes of imposing its own pains and penalties
- the "worst" case - it is valid for all purposes.
Id.
47. See, e.g.. People v. Baldasar, 52 11. App. 3d 305, 367 N.E.2d 459 (1977), rev'd on other
grounds, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1585 (1980). In Baldasar, the Illinois Appellate Court found that
an uncounseled conviction which resulted in a term of probation was not a conviction which resulted
in a term of imprisonment, and was therefore valid under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972). 52 111. App. 3d at 307-10, 367 N.E.2d at 461-63. SeealsoCottlev. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269
(5th Cir. 1973). Coule held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction which resulted in a twenty-
day suspended sentence was not a conviction which resulted in actual imprisonment, and was valid.
Id. at 275.
48. 440 U.S. at 374.
49. See supra note 47, and accompanying text.
50. The question is raised whether an uncounseled conviction which resulted in probation or a
suspended sentence would be invalidated by a subsequent revocation and incarceration. The
revocation could be treated similar to contempt for failure to pay a fine, see infra note 55, and the
incarceration upon revocation would thereby arguably be imposed for a subsequent act, and not for
the original uncounseled conviction. The uncounseled conviction would then not be rendered
invalid, because it did not result in imprisonment. See 440 U.S. at 373-74.
51. The United States Supreme Court answered this question in Baldasar v. Illinois, __ U.S.
__, 100 S. Ct. 1585 (1980) (per curiam). Petitioner had been convicted of misdemeanor theft, and
was fined $159 and sentenced to one year's probation. He was not represented by counsel in the
proceedings, and did not formally waive counsel. Petitioner was subsequently convicted again tinder
the same misdemeanor theft statute, which provided for an enhanced penalty for multiple offenders.
During the second trial, defense counsel argued that the first uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.
could not be used for enhancement of the second offense to a felony. Petitioner was ultimately
convicted under the enhancement provision, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one to three
years. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1586. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed petitioner's conviction,
holding that he had been imprisoned for the second theft, not the first. The court further found that
the first uncounseled conviction was valid because it did not result in incarceration, and was
therefore properly used under the enhancement statute, citing Agersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972). People v. Baldasar, 52 Ill. App. 3d 305, 307, 310, 367 N.E.2d 459, 462-63 (1977), rev'dper
curiam, -. U.S. -_, 100 S. Ct. 1585 (1980).
The United States Supreme Court reversed Baldasar's conviction, per curiam, for the reasons set
forth in three concurring opinions. Baldasar v. Illinois, - U.S. _ 100 S. Ct. 1585 (1980).
.tustice Stewart stated that Baldasar "was sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only
because he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of
appointed counsel in his defense." Id. at . 100 S. Ct. at 1587 (Stewart, J.. concurring)
(emphasis in original)' He therefore concluded that the prison term for the second conviction clearly
violated the "constitutional rule" of Scott. Id.
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viction would unquestionably be valid under Scott because it did not
result in a sentence to a term of imprisonment.52 Without using the
first uncounseled conviction in conjunction with a second
conviction, however, the greater penalty under the enhancement
statute would not be available. Thus, as a direct or collateral result
of the original uncounseled conviction, incarceration for an
additional period may be possible.
3
Another potential problem not addressed in Scott arises when a
person is sentenced to pay a fine and is later jailed for failure to pay
the fine.54 Refusal to pay a fine arguably constitutes-civil contempt,
and incarceration on the contempt charge is therefore unrelated to
the original conviction leading to the fine itself. Thus, the in-
carceration would be for contempt, not for the uncounseled con-
viction, and such incarceration would therefore not be con-
stitutionally impermissible. 15
One other question left open is whether Scott's holding can be
applied to the right to courisel on appeal. The North Dakota
Supreme Court recently confronted this problem in State v. Mees, 5 6
I his concurring opinion in Baldamr. Justice Marshall's efntrd hemc "is shat pctloncr hal
ch'arlv been deprived of his liberty as a consequence ofit Fhrst un('ttoseleil coo \'iion stating hat
"l conviction which is invalid for purposes of imposing a sentence of imprisonment for the offense
itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing a term of imprisonnmnt for a subsequent conviction
under a repteat-oflendler statute." __ U.S. ;at _ . IO( S. ('.. at 1588-8). (Marshall. J..
coocurring). Justiie Marshall went on to state that "a rule that ield a coniion invlid fotr
imposing a prison term directly, but valid for imposing a prison term collaterally, would be an
illogical and unworkable deviation from our previous cases." Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1589
(footnote omitted).
.Justice Blackmun adhered to the position, which hi had espoised in his dissen t in Scolt v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1979) (Blackmun, .J., dissenting). that all intinal defi'ndants shottl
be entitled to court-appointed counsel if charged with an offense punishable by more than six
months' imprisonment. -U.S. at__, 100 S. Ct. at 1585 (Blackmun,J., concurring). Blackmun
concluded that, beacause petitioner was prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six
months' imprisonment, he was entitled to counsel at the first misdemeanor proceeding. The first
conviction was therefore invalid and could not be used under the enhancement provision. Id. at
-, 100 S. Ct. at 1589-90.
52. Sr 440 U.S. at 373-74.
53. The various opinions in Raldaiar made it cear that tn u counsel'd ion iciion valid un(Jcr
Sicotl. may not he used under an enhancement statute tto impose a st-ntent'e of' in'ar i-rat(in
for a stt'ondI offense.. '. r. ,.,__ U.S. at __ . 1110 .Ct. n 1588-89 (Marshall. J.. concuirring).
Rel\ in tin the hldling in Baldaiar. ont might irg ti' fliat ;it uniotnslrd conviction ttav n(- r he
usiid lir ansi" ollateral purpose. suc'h as imiiai'hnttI' o lh-fi-'indtit's e-stimonv or consideration in
sIlbstluirn seneing d'ti'rminations. Se- U.S. t .... 100 S. 0. at 1592 (Poswl, .J
ifiss nt inz).
54. Se Nelson s. Tullos. 323 So. 2d 539 (Miss. 1975). Tli Supiile Court of Mississippi fihind
tIhat .'qrri'ntyr did not prohibit a si'nt(,'((' i a fint' Io hi (iinv i' d hln r into irslfrisonninl if tIhe
def'ttwiant ftih'ld to p' • the fini- after riasonahhl nletitses disigncd IiaFid t , paynt of th inie proved
uittsItici sflt .I . ;u 546. TFi iourt in Nrotn fiiii iil hat, ,rr'iner didl nont lirt-it that a detnfo lani titas
iesir hit' iotprisioi'n I ;as c ollateral i nst'qut' ee of'an itniitinsel.i ( nvii tin. Id.
55. Id. at 545. The rationale in Nlson was that the imprisonment was for failure to comply with
the original sentence ofa fine and wias actually, therefore, imprisonment for civil ontempt, not for
the original unc(onseled conviction. Id.
56. 272 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1978). The defendants' right to counsel in Mees was determined hv
rule 44 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which incorporates thi- holding of
Argersinger s. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 272 N.W.2d at 290. Ser Travis. An Introduction to the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, 50 N.D.L. RF%. 20 (1973) (commenting on the then newly adopted
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure). Rule 44 provides:
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in which the court took note of the Illinois Supreme Court's holding
in Scott, which was then on appeal to the United State Supreme
Court.5 7 The court in Mees affirmed the trial court's determination
that the indigent defendants had no right to appointed counsel on
appeal because they had not been sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment. 58 It is possible, however, that the application of the
holding in Scott to the right to counsel on appeal was not con-
templated by the United States Supreme Court.
59
Although the opinion in Scott v. Illinois has left sev-
eral issues unresolved, it did clarify that the actual im-
prisonment standard of Argersinger is the current test to be used to
determine whether an indigent defendant is entitled to court-
appointed counsel.
MONTY G. MERTZ
Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver. every indigent defendant shall be
entitled to have counsel appointed at publk" expense to represent him at every stage of
the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate through appeal in all
I.elony cases. Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver. every indigent defendant shall
be entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense to represent him at every stage
of the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate through appeal in
all nonfelony cases unless the magistrate has determined that sentence upon conviction
will not include imprisonment. The court shall appoint counsel to represent a
defendant at his expense if he is unable to secure the assistance of counsel and is not
indigent. ,
N.D.R. CRIM. P. 44.
57. State v. Mees. 272 N.W.2d 284, 291 n.2. (N.D. 1978). Mres involved the arrest and
conviction of two women for prostitution. Their conviction resulted in a fine. Because both women
were indigent, they were represented by court-appointed counsel at trial. Both women made timely
motions for court-appointed counsel to represent them on appeal. The trial court denied the motions
pursuant to rule 44 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. reasoning that because there
had been no imprisonment, there was no right to appointed counsel on appeal. The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed this determination. Id. at 290-91. The women in Mees made largely the
same arguments as petitioner in Scott. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected these
arguments, citing Argersinger v. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and taking note of People v. Scott. 68
IIl 2d 269. 369 N.E.2d 881 (1977). then on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 272 N.W.2d
at 291 n.2.
58. 272 N.W.2d at 290-91.
59. There is some question whether the ultimate holding in Scott. as adopted in anticipation by
the North Dakota Supreme Court in Mees. was properly applied to right to counsel on appeal. The
United States Supreme Court held in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), that denial of
appointed counsel for an indigent defendant on an initial appeal of right was a violation of equal
protection. Id. at 357-58. There was no indication in Douglos that its holding was restricted only to
cases in which the defendant was incarcerated. See id. at 353. The Court's opinion and holding in
Scott made no mention of appointment of counsel to indigent defendants to make an appeal of right.
See 440 U.S. at 368-74. It is therefore arguable that the Court in Scott did not intend to affect thc"
holding in Douolas. Thus, .it is possible that the North Dakota Supreme Court's application ofScott in
Mees was improper. See 272 N.W.2d at 291 n.2.

